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Abstract
The paper deals with refugees and internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) . Considering their numbers, Serbia is the first 
in Europe and fourteenth on the globe . Their destiny is not 
only a tragic epilogue to the political dissolution of the for-
mer Yugoslavia, but also to the breakdown of the common 
dream of “Yugoslav” nationality (which was meant to be a 
“melting pot” of various nations, ethnic groups, and reli-
gions) . Unfortunately, due to the specific strategy of nation-
state building based on ethnic cleansing, refugees were 
one of the direct objectives of civil wars taking place in the 
1990s . At the same time, massive floods of IDPs were insti-
gated by the bombing campaign of Kosovo and Metohija 
conducted by the NATO alliance in 1999 .
Having come to Serbia, the majority of both refugees 
and IDPs who are ethnic Serbs have attained all the fea-
tures of minority groups . The reasons for their social exclu-
sion must be discussed in terms of their exceptionally low 
social position, high levels of unemployment and poverty, 
and lack of social inclusion . Moreover, it must be taken into 
account that contemporary Serbia faced many unresolved 
political challenges, delayed accession to the EU, secession 
of Kosovo and Metohija in 2008, hardships in establishing 
a market economy and liberal democracy since 2000, and 
economic deprivation, all of which were accompanied by 
poor social services .
Serbian authorities adopted four major action plans 
targeted at forced migrants .
However, the main challenges to their applicability stem 
from lack of institutional capacities, ineffective implemen-
tation of development strategies, and limited resources .
Résumé
La Serbie occupe le premier rang en Europe et le quatorzième 
rang sur terre parmi les pays ayant le plus de réfugiés et de 
déplacés internes . Leur destin n’est pas seulement l’épilogue 
tragique de la dissolution politique de l’ex-Yougoslavie, mais 
aussi de la fin du rêve commun d’une nationalité « yougos-
lave » (censée être un « melting pot » de différentes nations, 
groupes ethniques et religions) . Malheureusement, en rai-
son d’une stratégie de construction d’État-nation fondée sur 
le nettoyage ethnique, les réfugiés ont été l’un des objectifs 
directs des guerres civiles se déroulant dans les années 1990 . 
En même temps, un massif afflux de personnes déplacées a 
été suscité par la campagne de bombardement menée par 
l’OTAN au Kosovo-et-Métochie en 1999 .
Venue en Serbie, la majorité des réfugiés et des déplacés 
internes Serbes ethniques ont pourtant atteint toutes les 
caractéristiques des groupes minoritaires . Les raisons de leur 
exclusion sociale doivent être examinées en fonction de leur 
rang social exceptionnellement bas, de taux de chômage et 
de pauvreté élevés et d’une absence d’inclusion sociale . En 
outre, il faut prendre en considération les nombreux défis 
politiques non résolus qui confrontent la Serbie contempo-
raine, le retardement de son adhésion à l’Union européenne, 
la sécession du Kosovo-et-Métochie en 2008, les difficultés à 
établir une économie de marché et instaurer la démocratie 
libérale depuis 2000 et, enfin, des privations économiques, le 
tout accompagné par des services sociaux inadéquats .
Les autorités serbes ont adopté quatre importants plans 
d’action destinés aux migrants forcés . Toutefois, les princi-
paux défis à leur applicabilité proviennent d’un manque de 
capacité institutionnelle, d’une mise en œuvre inefficace de 
stratégies de développement et d’un manque de ressources .
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Introduction
According to a report in 2009 by the United Nations High 
Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), contemporary 
Serbia hosts the largest number of refugees and internally 
displaced persons in Europe (and is ranked fourteenth on 
the globe). Besides them, there are a great number of vic-
tims of transit trafficking and smuggling across the borders, 
consisting predominantly of women, children, and young 
adults. Furthermore, the greatest portions of asylum seekers 
in the EU come from Serbia, together with returnees, who 
had fled to the EU (mostly Germany) during the nineties 
and are at the moment in the process of readmission. Many 
young, educated people, among whom there is a growing 
number of females, strive to move to the West, in search 
of better living conditions and employment opportunities. 
One of the greatest obstacles to the management of migra-
tion flows derives from the fact that Serbia lacks a common, 
harmonized visa regime which would establish stable rela-
tions with other states (unrestricted mobility of people, 
goods, and capital).
Refugees from ex-Yugoslavia and internally displaced 
persons from Kosovo and Metohija are the focus of this 
paper. They have been arriving in Serbia ever since 1992 
(in the case of refugees)1 and since the bombing campaign 
of NATO forces in 1999 and terrorist attacks of ethnic 
Albanians against Serbs and other non-Albanians at Kosovo 
in 2004 up to nowadays (in the case of IDPs).
Refugees are the tragic epilogue to the collapse not only 
of the political and socio-economic system, but to the dream 
of the unifying Yugoslav nation. Disintegration of the ex-
Yugoslavia occurred as a concomitant of the fall of Berlin 
Wall and thus the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the 
last decade of the twentieth century. While the countries 
of central and Eastern Europe experienced peaceful social 
transition and state disintegration, the former Yugoslavia 
had undergone a process of enormous breakdown or “social 
explosion” that was reflected in the sanguinary civil war 
drama of 1992–1995. Disintegration of the former federal 
state resulted in the creation of new, autonomous states 
and entities, with concomitant enormous flows of forced 
migrants.2 Political elites were pursuing their dream of 
national states based on “blood and soil” by, inter alia, insti-
gating large migrational flows and assimilation of the rest 
of the population. The civil wars that broke out in Croatia 
and Bosnia and Hercegovina were inspired by a romantic 
ideology of “pure nation” (the so-called “eastern model of 
nation building,”3 and, therefore, ethnic cleansing was one 
of the means to meet that end. In other words, these cir-
cumstances explain why the flood of refugees was one of 
the direct political and war objectives in the 1990s in the 
Balkans.
Consequently, refugees of Serb origin flooded to the 
region of the Republic of Serbia. Not only did they rep-
resent forced migrants, who fled from surrounding war 
zones, but they were the cruel testimony to the failed war 
adventures of the previous authoritarian political regime 
of Milosevic as well. However, regardless of what country 
would receive them, they would end up being marginalized, 
having to share the destiny of other minority groups (the 
poor, the elderly, minor ethnic groups, Roma, the disabled, 
etc.). Over time, the quality of their lives has been improv-
ing gradually. However, the pace of improvement has been 
very slow, because Serbia is experiencing painful and stalled 
socio-economic transformation, along with coping with a 
huge army of impoverished, unemployed, and socially dis-
advantaged individuals. Thus, the refugees are bound to pay 
the double price of social exclusion: the part of the general 
price of social transition burdening all members of society 
plus their own specific price.4
This paper is based on some general theoretical consider-
ations of (forced) migrations. The main foundation consists 
of the theory of “push and pull” factors, created by Donald 
Bogue as well as on relevant considerations of the multiple 
factors, which are intertwined and act as determinant fac-
tors.5 The study of migratory flows is necessarily interdisci-
plinary, thus integrating various scientific standpoints of 
sociology, psychology, geography, law, political science, and 
economy.
Methodology is tailored for the specific purpose of this 
article. Its main goals are: (1) general description of refu-
gees and IDPs; (2) some basic socio-economic analysis of 
these groups, and (3) review of current political solutions. 
Main sources consist of: demographics, secondary analysis 
of empirical findings on refugees and IDPs, and an overview 
of political solutions.
Main Concepts and Definitions
As David J. Whittaker states,6 there are more and more 
people moving around the globe than ever before in recorded 
history. Some estimates say that since 1945 some 50 to 60 
million people have left their homes either voluntarily or 
involuntarily. Europe in the 1950s, Africa in the 1960s, Asia 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and once more Europe, especially 
since the 1990s, were the so-called “zones of anguish,” from 
which people have flooded. Those are the victims of persecu-
tion and conflict, who have been seeking safety and oppor-
tunities out of their country of origin. These groups are 
so-called genuine refugees. However, they may also be the 
victims of environmental degradation, while some are dis-
placed within their own land (so-called internally displaced 
persons). Other groups of forced migrants are victims of wars 
and ethnic cleansing. Many people are unable to escape, and 
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are therefore holed up in temporary camps, while still others 
flee abroad, becoming illegal immigrants.
It is a fact that an ongoing process of globalization is 
making the world a smaller place while at the same time 
squeezing time and space due to faster and cheaper trans-
portation and movement from one country to another, from 
one continent to another.
According to the same author, there are at least 17 million 
people in transit nowadays, seeking some form of asylum—
over 6 million in Asia, 4.2 million in Africa, and 4.2 million 
in Europe. It is very likely that half of these unfortunates are 
women and children.
The existence of numerously diverse moves of forced 
migrants opens up a discussion on various definitions and 
relevant notions. The UN Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 1951 defined the term “refugee” with the mean-
ing that is still being used today:
A person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual 
residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/ 
her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him-
self/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for 
fear of persecution.7
The term “persecution” itself is not legally defined, but 
is generally based on persistent and consistent patterns of 
abuse, intervention, and intolerance.
Internally displaced persons are:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to 
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in par-
ticular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed con-
flict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights 
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized State border.8
Setting the Stage: Some Basic Demographic 
Features
The first census on refugees and war-affected population in 
Serbia was conducted in 1996 by UNHCR. According to it, 
there were 617,728 individuals registered in Serbia. After a 
while, a vast majority have either obtained citizenship of the 
Republic of Serbia (143,200) or returned to their countries 
of origin (144,000). A total of 22,400 have resettled to third 
countries.
If we pay attention to the period 1996–2007, the evidence 
clearly documents the decreasing trend of refugees (Table 
1). In particular, the last UNHCR report from 2007 dem-
onstrates that their volume is 6.3 times lower than that 
registered in 1996. It is, however, an unresolved dilemma 
whether the data conceal the empirical reality. In other 
words, is the reduction in their overall number the outcome 
of the cancellation of their humanitarian status instead of 
their full integration into the local society? Refugees were 
offered three options for a permanent solution of their legal 
status: (1) return to the countries they were forced to leave; (2) 
integration into the local community (Serbia); and (3) emi-
gration. As we shall show later, many of those who decided 
to return were denied their civil rights in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, due to the hostility of the local popula-
tion, unresolved tenancy and property rights, and so forth. 
The second group, who was willing to integrate in the host 
society, applied for and in many cases received Serbian cit-
izenship. Unfortunately, this did not automatically result in 
the improvement of their overall conditions. Many of them 
joined the pool of unemployed citizens (the unemployment 
rate in the country is nearly 30 per cent), thus lacking social 
security and other social services (health, education, public 
transportation, etc.).
Table 1. Refugees, Serbia, 1996–2007
Year Refugees and  
war affected 
persons
Total  
population
Share of 
refugees and 
war affected 
persons (in %)
1996 617728 9778991* 6,3
2002 379135 7498001 5,1
2005 139195 7440769 1,9
2007 97700 7397651 1,3
Note: *in 1996 Serbia included the territory of Kosovo and 
Metohija
Source: UNHCR census and statistics for 1996, 2005, and 2007, 
respectively; Census of Serbian population Beograd: SZS, 2002; 
Izbeglički korpus u Srbiji, prema podacima popisa stanovništva 
2002, (Refugee Corpus in Serbia) Ministarstvo za ljudska i 
 manjinska prava Srbije i Crne Gore i Republički zavod za statis-
tiku i informatiku Srbije, 2004; <http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/
axd/god.htm>
Gender and Age Distributions
According to the last figures (2007) one may conclude that 
females outnumber males. The workforce contingent (age 
18–59) prevails, but among them, males are more repre-
sented. One-third of the total are the elderly, mostly females, 
and the share of babies and the youth (age 0–17) is 11.3 per 
cent.
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Table 2. Refugees in Serbia – age and gender break-
down, 2007
age M % F % Total %
0–4 195 0.2 196 0.2 391 0.4
5–11 2057 2.1 1964 2.0 4021 4.1
12–17 3416 3.5 3199 3.3 6615 6.8
18–59 31605 32.4 27204 27.9 58809 60.2
60+ 10202 10.4 17634 18.1 27836 28.5
Total 47475 48.6 50197 51.4 97672 100
Source: <http://www.unhcr.org.yu/utils/File.aspx?id=237> 
(accessed October 2009).
Cultural, Social end Economic Capital
The last census data9 indicates that human/cultural capital 
of refugees is more favourable in comparison to the general 
Serbian population, in terms of their completed secondary 
and higher education.10
Regarding socio-economic status of the total refugee 
population, the employed are dominant (47 per cent), fol-
lowed by the dependant (37.9 per cent) and those with a per-
sonal income—the retired (14.7 per cent).11 Slightly less than 
half of the non-self-supporting persons are women (47.3 per 
cent). Compared to the general population, refugees have 
slightly higher rates of employment, a fact that could be 
explained by their higher subsistence risks and their need to 
rapidly accommodate to new environments.
The share of refugees with a personal income is, how-
ever, lower compared to the general population, due to the 
problems of pension transfers from the ex-Yugoslav repub-
lics. This explains the higher ratio of non-self-supporting 
persons in the refugee population. To the contrary, refugees 
have a less advantageous employment structure compared 
to the general population. Among the active population in 
Serbia, the employed (78.53 per cent) largely outnumber 
the unemployed (21.47 per cent). In the refugee popula-
tion, the respective ratios are 64.2 per cent and 35.8 per 
cent. This fact could be explained as a result of the great 
difficulties in finding a job and by a so-called “fluctuating 
pattern of the working career” (frequent changing of jobs, 
moonlighting, and losses of jobs). It is also the argument 
for their social exclusion. As for the professional structure, 
the majority of refugees work in the service industry and 
trade (16.2 per cent); followed by skilled workers and tech-
nicians (15.1 per cent) and then those performing simple, 
unqualified work (12.2 per cent). And last, but not least, 
although the majority of refugees come from the villages, 
most of them settled in Serbian urban zones. This means 
that forced migration imposed a forced deruralization of 
the immigrants.12
One recent non-representative survey conducted among 
the working-age population of refugees (age 15–64)13 
showed higher activity and employment rates among 
them compared to the general Serbian population in the 
same age group. It also demonstrated that the unemploy-
ment rate among forced migrants is ten percentage points 
higher (30.6 per cent compared to 20.8 per cent in the gen-
eral Serbian work force). The refugees not only have higher 
proactive strategies in terms of their crude employment 
rate, but they also outnumber in the shares of entrepreneurs 
and self-employed. But, at the same time, some one-third 
are engaged in informal activities. They are compelled to 
start small businesses on their own, for they lack assistance 
of the state and its National Employment Agency. Income 
generating projects, implemented by both government and 
nongovernmental sectors, are neither transparent nor avail-
able to them, so refugees can hardly opt for resources as well 
as for application. That also makes the doors wide open to 
corruption and delivering grants to those who have already 
established their firms.
Other results point to the fact that despite their greater 
human capital, many refugees work below their qualifica-
tions: one out of four with a university diploma works as a 
highly skilled or skilled worker in the informal economy.
They are also under pressure of combining several jobs, 
with every third refugee taking an additional job on a regu-
lar basis. They mostly work in construction, catering, taking 
care of the elderly, and housekeeping.
Beside demonstrated willingness to work, refugees are 
shown to be more flexible in the labour market, in terms 
of readiness to take part in activities beyond usual working 
hours, without a contract, or in the private sector. They are 
willing to perform any paid job regardless of their educa-
tional level as well as to moonlight. However, they are reluc-
tant to change their place of residency in case of another 
job offer. Women also demonstrated strong proactive 
orientations.
Thus, we can conclude, while the human and social cap-
ital are either relatively high or are increasing over time, the 
economic capital, conversely, remains rather low. The main 
reason is the very fact that the refugees’ properties were left 
behind them in their former places of residence (Croatia and 
Bosnia). Only 20 per cent of them managed to preserve or 
repossess their property. Moreover, the overall household 
expenditure (food, clothing, hygiene items, etc.) is some 50 
per cent higher compared to the general population. The 
composite index of wealth (constructed as the aggregation of 
assets, expenditure, and income) clearly demonstrates that 
10 per cent of these households are definitely poor, some 49 
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per cent have a low wealth score (with a high poverty risk), 
while 27 per cent have medium, 11 per cent high, and 3 per 
cent very high scores.
According to the research on social capital, it should be 
stated that inquiries conducted in 1990s in Serbia14 have 
shown a low level of informal social networks both within 
the refugee group and with the host population. Moreover, 
analyses of the social position of refugees and the general 
quality of their life have clearly shown their social system 
inhibition, i .e . their withdrawal to the margins of social life 
or to the bottom of the social scale, by political and legal 
means, media, and everyday behaviour of the domestic 
population. The empirical findings report that refugees suf-
fer feelings of resignation, depression, and isolation15 Social 
capital was, thus, very sporadic, restricted to their fellow 
friends and acquaintances. The ties were based on a common 
dwelling, leisure time, nurturing children, and the elderly. 
They either dreamed of returning to homelands or finding 
ways to permanently reside in Serbia.16 But, as time went by, 
during the last fourteen years, these individuals have been 
compelled to surpass various obstacles in their everyday life, 
which resulted in enhancing their social capital.
The most important occasions when a person utilizes 
assets of social capital are when searching either for a job 
or for health treatment. Informal networks of reciprocity 
consist mainly of friends and relatives (“bonding social 
capital”).17 The same applies to refugees. However, they are 
often under pressure to perform direct contacts to employers 
because they rarely use services of the National Employment 
Agency. They either have little information about rights and 
options that the state agency is offering or they hesitate to 
register. This is particularly the case when they have not yet 
obtained citizenship, although citizenship is not a prerequi-
site for entering the informal labour market. In addition, 
they also lack information on their beneficiary rights when 
registered at the Agency (i .e . concerning health care, social 
protection, subsidies in transportation, etc).
The latest empirical research18 showed strengthening 
of their informal ties to the local population, particularly 
when searching a job, as well as their willingness to broaden 
relations to domiciles (some 36 per cent have opened up 
ties to both fellow friends and local citizens). At the same 
time, surveys no longer demonstrated statements showing 
intolerance toward them on the part of the local population. 
This appears to prove that the process of their final integra-
tion is under way.
In conclusion, we can say that refugees face great 
obstacles in transforming their cultural capital (high level 
of education and professional skills) into economic capital, 
which is the main cause of their getting along poorly, weak 
social connectedness, and still low social capital (informal 
networks to local citizens). The main reasons are immense 
difficulties in accessing the labour market and structural 
challenges (delayed post-socialistic transformation, high 
overall unemployment rate, etc.).
Refugee Emigrations: Mixture of Economic and 
Humanitarian Incentives
A certain number of other empirical studies have shown 
that emigration to the developed West (the EU, Canada, 
Australia, and the US) was one of the prevalent “coping 
strategies” for forced migrants. It was somewhat easier for 
these people to apply for entry during the Balkan crisis in 
the nineties. However, not only were the younger genera-
tions prone to the strategy of “escapism,” but so were those 
who had already established ties to foreign countries and 
those who found themselves in foreign countries at the 
onset of the war in the former Yugoslavia (descendants of 
older economic emigrants, those already having established 
business contacts, etc.).
Another qualitative—case study of former Yugoslav 
refugees in England was carried out comparatively on two 
sub-samples: persons who got asylum in Oxford, UK, and 
those who fled to Serbia.19 In-depth analysis indicates the 
clear economic “pull” factors of emigration—better chan-
ces for improving living conditions in comparison to those 
who went to Serbia. However, the refugees, residing in the 
UK claimed that although their quality of life was improved 
owing to the welfare state,20 they were also generally socially 
excluded. Due to inability to attain employment that would 
match their qualifications, they were confronted with addi-
tional difficulties, such as inaccessibility of a variety of 
beneficial services (medical care, education, culture, and 
informal ties to the domestic population).
Furthermore, refugees staying in England also had low 
social capital. They were rarely getting along with either 
previous generations of economic migrants or the host 
English population. Even their contacts with relatives 
in Serbia were rare. Thus, social ties were reduced to an 
extremely narrow circle of close people and fellow friends. 
Nevertheless, such a situation leads to social exclusion and, 
finally, self-isolation.
When it comes to future prospects, it came as no sur-
prise that most of the middle-aged and older people with 
asylum in England intended to return to Serbia, mainly to 
Vojvodina,21 after they accumulate savings in order to afford 
some real estate (a house with a piece of land).
Having summarized the optimal solutions for the forced 
migrants’ status, some practical measures were suggested. 
First and most important is dual citizenship for each per-
son who chooses to permanently settle in Serbia. This would 
enable refugees and displaced persons to get full citizenship 
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status and all due rights: freedom of movement, work, med-
ical care, education, and political and other rights. Refugees’ 
repatriation should also be encouraged, and this is especially 
important for the elderly, since their most important issue is 
the regularity of payments of their pensions from the places 
of their earlier residence (in former Yugoslavia).
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
Unlike refugees, the total number of internally displaced 
persons in Serbia is decreasing too slowly. The first group of 
225,738 persons left Kosovo and Metohija in 1999, following 
the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and security forces. 
Afterwards, an additional population of 4,200 persons left 
in spring 2004, after the series of violent acts of majority 
Albanians against ethnic minorities (non-Albanians) and 
international government (UNMIK) in the province. In 
future, one could expect further outflows of non-Albanians 
due to the claimed independence of Kosovo in March 2008.
Their actual total number is 206,504 (Table 3). According 
to the latest figures (2007), gender structure is almost equal. 
The workforce contingent (age 18–59) prevails, again with-
out specific gender imbalances. One out of six is the elderly, 
with females dominating slightly, while the share of babies 
and the youth (age 0–17) is 11.3 per cent.
Table 3. IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro – 
age and gender structure, 2007*
age M % F % Total %
0–4 440 0.2 378 0.2 818 0.4
5–11 11246 5.4 10651 5.2 21897 10.6
12–17 12431 6.0 11609 5.6 24040 11.6
18–59 62293 30.2 61691 29.9 123984 60.0
60+ 15975 7.7 19790 9.6 35765 17.3
Total 102385 49.5 104119 50.5 206504 100
*Note: vast majority settled in Serbia (92 per cent), minority of 
some 8 per cent fled to Montenegro
Source: http://www.unhcr.org.yu/utils/File.aspx?id=237 (accessed 
October 2009).
As for ethnic structure, most of them are Serbs (68 per 
cent), then Roma (12 per cent), and Montenegrins (8 
per cent)22 They live mainly in private accommodations 
(93 per cent), and about 7 per cent are located in collect-
ive centres. In 2002 there were about 550 collective centres 
in Serbia and Montenegro. However, in 2002 the procedure 
of their planned closure was launched. By the end of 2005 
there were 278 centres, out of which 99 were official, while 
the rest were unofficial, with almost none of the refugees and 
a decreasing share of IDPs. According to the last UNHCR 
report, there are only 80 collective centres (62 are situated in 
Serbia and 18 in Kosovo). They accommodate 6,748 persons 
(1,702 refugees and 5,046 IDPs).23
When the quality of life is considered, this population is 
not only below the poverty line on a social scale or slightly 
over it, but is also extremely poor and at the very edge of 
society. Beside lacking regular income, they also lack suit-
able business opportunities. A survey carried out by inter-
national institutions on the sample of 1,400 people accom-
modated in Serbia showed that 52 per cent are unemployed, 
14.4 per cent are working in the public sector, which often 
means that their job is just fictional (without payment or 
underpayment), 10 per cent are employed in private firms, 
and 5.5 per cent are engaged in seasonal jobs. There are 18.5 
per cent of supported persons, out of whom 7.3 per cent are 
students and 11.2 per cent are retired. Their work is under-
paid and consequently accompanied with the intense feeling 
of constant humiliation. There was the evidence of wages of 
only 1 DEM per day.24
Although formally “citizens” of Serbia, IDPs are restricted 
in claiming their basic human rights. Experiencing gross 
violations of their civil rights on an everyday basis makes 
them de facto “quasi citizens” of Serbia.
Since they rarely succeed in getting their residence in 
Serbia, their freedom of movement is restricted. This hap-
pens because the Serbian authorities imply that their home-
land is in Kosovo, and that they will surely return there. 
That’s why they are issued “temporary residence permits” 
that are valid for three months only, that would have to be 
prolonged afterwards. There are a lot of reports of cancella-
tions of these documents for those who had to change their 
place of residence in Serbia or had to visit Kosovo. Thus not 
only do they suffer violations of freedom of movement, but 
also the essential right to choose a place to live.
Another problem concerning IDPs is claiming personal 
identification rights (obtaining identity cards, passports, 
working booklets). Basically, they have the right to gain new 
identity cards in Serbia, but in an attempt to obtain them, 
they have to provide a variety of documents/certificates on 
residence, birth, marriage, and citizenship. In order to have 
these issued, they often have to travel to the various local 
offices and archives that are relocated to different places in 
southern Serbia, once they have been displaced from Kosovo. 
That makes huge impediments for IDPs due to the necessity 
of making several trips, not only to apply for the documents, 
but also aquire them later on, which is hardly affordable by 
the majority of refugees.
IDPs have similar problems with working booklets. These 
documents can be obtained only in the firms or compan-
ies where they previously worked, while it is almost impos-
sible to reach them from private companies at Kosovo. 
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Ex-employees from the public enterprises out of Kosovo 
are in a somewhat better position. They are able to get these 
certificates and utilize their pension rights more easily, for 
the appropriate records have been transferred to Serbian 
municipalities. The lack of work booklets prevents one from 
realization of the right to support oneself and receive social 
care, if necessary.
Another example of gross violation of their civil rights 
is medical care. With their health endangered, IDPs are a 
very sensitive group in this respect—76 per cent of them 
have chronic diseases that require long medical treatment. 
Alcoholism and psychosocial symptoms related to war 
traumas are also frequently present. Some 8 per cent of chil-
dren suffer from partial or total exhaustion, and no less than 
17. 2 per cent from stunted growth.25 However, regardless of 
these facts, refugees have the right to be treated in primary 
and urgent medical care only, while for all other kinds of 
services, they are obliged to pay instantly. In terms of their 
general situation, it is clear that they cannot bear the costs 
of any medical treatment, which additionally contributes to 
further worsening of their already damaged health.
Social security rights are another field of great risk for 
IDPs. If one has a job in Serbia, whether it is paid or not, 
or if he/she has any private property (including Kosovo), 
he/she cannot apply for aid. According to the statistics of 
the Ministry of Social Security, less than 10 per cent of the 
population in Serbia receive benefits of social protection, 
although a survey on poverty carried out in 2001 demon-
strated that one-quarter of internally displaced persons live 
at or under the poverty line (in terms of more than $1 per 
capita).26
The problem of property rights is also a very sensitive 
one. Despite the fact that many of the displaced persons 
have their property left in Kosovo, they are not able to access 
it. At the same time, they are unable to obtain aid for solv-
ing their housing problems as long as they live in Serbia or 
unless they are included in some large-scale repatriation 
programs.
Roma IDPs are in an even worse social position. They 
are at the very bottom, not only within this group, but in 
the overall society as well. The vast majority of them are 
located in collective centres or in slums of the cities and its 
outskirts. With many children (due to predominantly high 
fertility), elderly, large families, mostly unemployed, sick 
and disabled persons, they are almost completely marginal-
ized. The level of education is low and children usually do 
not attend school. Their main income comes from begging 
and some kind of trade.
Regarding their future plans and perspectives, IDPs are 
in a very dubious situation. Contemporary Serbian author-
ities do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state (as 
unilaterally claimed in March 2008). Thus, they claim their 
return to the province, while the people affected do not 
believe in the sustainability of such a solution, particularly 
due to the absence of the Serbian army and police in Kosovo. 
In fact, despite the presence of international armed forces in 
the province (UNMIK), the primary reason for their fears 
and anxiety is lack of security and freedom of movement for 
Serbs and non-Albanians.
Policy: Strategic Documents and Perspectives
The Serbian government adopted three main documents 
that are the basis for integration of refugees from ex-Yugo-
slav republics. These are: National Strategy for Resolving 
the Problems of Refugees and IDPs, the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, and the “Road Map.”
In May 2002, the Serbian government adopted the 
National Strategy for Resolving the Problems of Refugees 
and Displaced Persons, with the support of the international 
and local stakeholders (UNHCR, UNDP, UNOCHA, NGOs, 
etc). The main goal aims at providing conditions in two 
broad directions: (1) repatriation and (2) local integration 
of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (accord-
ing to their personal choice). Starting from the empirical 
evidence (surveys and interviews) which demonstrated the 
will of the majority of them to stay in Serbia, the integration 
into local settings was posed as the most desirable and dur-
able solution. In that sense, the existing document (National 
Strategy) strives to facilitate the process. The strategy has 
well-developed schemes for ameliorating problems of hous-
ing, employment, property and legal status issues, security, 
and safety; and durable solutions for those accommodated 
in collective centres that are to be closed (those are the most 
vulnerable groups—the elderly, lone parents, mostly females, 
children without parents, sick people, the unemployed, and 
others unable to take care of themselves). However, the prin-
ciple challenge of the implementation of the strategy is the 
great financial resources required, on the side of Serbian 
government and foreign funding, the latter being signifi-
cantly reduced in 2003 and 2004.27
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was adopted by 
Serbian government in 2003. Its basic goal was social end 
economic recovery of the country, with special attention 
paid to reducing huge overall poverty and vulnerable groups 
(like refugees and IDPs). Unfortunately, up to this date, it 
has stayed mostly unrealized, for the same reasons as the 
previously mentioned action plan, which is, actually, the 
complementary one. The second reason is the institutional 
gaps in development of the projected instruments.
In 2003 there was some political progress towards normal-
ization of relationships between the neighbouring Balkan 
states, and henceforth a gradual improvement of certain 
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conditions for repatriation. A bilateral agreement between 
Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed, 
and a visa regime with Croatia was abolished. The regional 
initiative called the “Road Map” was launched, aimed at 
finding long-term solutions by 2006 for all forced migrants 
in new Balkan states, derived out of former Yugoslavia. 
It was encouraged by the UNHCR, The Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE, and the 
European Commission. On January 31, 2005, in Sarajevo 
the declaration on the regional resolution of the problems 
of refugees and displaced persons was signed (except those 
from Kosovo and Metohija), by the ministers of three states: 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. 
The Road Map assumed a joint matrix of national action 
plans directed at repatriation or integration among the 
three signatory countries. Up to now, there have been only 
two chapters of joint implementation action created, one 
concerning common statistics and another related to access 
to basic human rights. Concerning these issues, it should 
be stated that the return shares are very low—in most cases 
persons who decided to repatriate to Croatia and Bosnia 
were pushed to return to Serbia after a while, for their homes 
were either destroyed, or repossessed, and their safety was 
jeopardized. So, the return to Bosnia-Hercegovina in 2005 
was even twelve times less compared to 2002. The decreas-
ing number of returns might be caused by the fact that it was 
the most difficult cases that remained to be solved.
Speaking of Croatia, officials report that there are 122,000 
Serbs returnees, while the association of Croatian Serbs 
and the OSCE mission estimate the real number as being 
much lower. Furthermore, they assess that 60 to 65 per cent 
of Serbs have actually returned to Serbia, Montenegro, and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina after a short stay, due to unresolved 
issues: tenancy/occupation rights, restricted access to prop-
erty, unregistered working hours (in the period 1991–1995 
in Croatia), problems in claiming retirement rights, and low 
levels of safety and security.
As to IDPs, in 2006 the Serbian government and UNMIK 
signed the Protocol on Sustainable Returns, declaring free-
dom of settlement in places that might not be their original 
places of residence. Unfortunately, very few succeeded in 
returning to Kosovo, only 650, due to uncertain conditions 
at the ground, employment difficulties, restricted freedom 
of movement and security risks, continuing impunity and 
weakness of the rule of law, and also discriminatory practi-
ces toward them.
Final Comments
This short overview has been intended to demonstrate the 
vulnerability of these two social groups of forced migrants 
and, as well, the complexity and diversity of practical actions 
that are undertaken in finding sustainable solutions. The 
very fact of the declining number of refugees does not neces-
sarily mean that they are either repatriated or integrated into 
local society . On the contrary, it is very often the case that 
their humanitarian status has been cancelled and thus they 
were actually transferred to the poor domicile population, 
falling at the bottom line of the social ladder . The vast major-
ity of them are fully socially excluded (the elderly, the sick, 
the unemployed, those with special needs, women, children, 
lone parents, those accommodated in collective centres, 
etc.).
Although a majority of refugees opted for and received 
Serbian citizenship, it didn’t bring them much improvement 
in social status. Despite their relatively better educational 
background, their unemployment rate is even greater than 
among the local population, and their access to health care 
and to social and protective services is hampered. This is due 
to the hardships of social transformation of Serbian society 
into the market economy and, consequently, low economic 
growth and overall political advancement, including the 
accession to the European Union and global institutions.
It is a fact that there are very detailed action plans 
developed to facilitate the integration of refugees, while the 
political status of IDPs is very complicated and, thus, vague. 
However, there are two types of impediments to the process 
of integration of refugees and IDPs: legal framework and 
lack of sufficient revenues.
The current legal framework prevents claiming of basic 
human rights, because it is based on the right to reside on 
certain territory, and does not take into account the vul-
nerability and reality of everyday life of these individuals. 
Secondly, the Serbian government has adopted very detailed 
strategies and signed agreements with neighbouring states 
on long-term solutions of either repatriation or local inte-
gration. Up to date, not much has been done in the area of 
repatriation, especially due to the lack of bilateral agreement 
concerning the most vulnerable refugees, former tenancy 
right holders, and elderly citizens. The risks of local integra-
tion into Serbian society are related to overall stalled social 
transformation and economic recovery, i .e ., lack of financial 
resources that would boost the otherwise very developed 
schemes in housing, income generating projects, women’s 
employment, education, improved medical care, social pro-
tection of the disabled, the elderly, and the sick, etc.
The uniqueness of the IDPs must be particularly empha-
sized. The fact that Serbian government does not recognize 
the independence of Kosovo province, which has been unilat-
erally claimed by local Albanian authorities in March 2008, 
places the vast majority of non-Albanians who remained 
there, as well as those who have settled in Serbia, in a very 
complicated position. Namely, those who stayed in Kosovo 
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live in enclaves, isolated, socially excluded, frightened about 
their safety and their children’s safety and future. For those 
who stayed in Serbia, the plans of repatriation and return to 
Kosovo seem to be fading, while the officials still “manipu-
late” their destiny in unsuccessful political negotiations, not 
being ready to give up the political struggle to return the 
province to Serbian sovereignty.
Notes
 1. According to the relevant resources (UNHCR office in 
Belgrade), in 2009 the number of registered refugees in 
Serbia has been 86,336, which is seven times less comparing 
to their peak in 1996. The decrease has been facilitated due 
to four main channels: local integration (around 200,000 
have obtained Serbian citizenship), returns (150,000 have 
returned to the countries of origin in the region), emigra-
tion to the West (46,000), while some of them died in exile 
(40,000, Human Rights of Refugees, Internally Displaced 
Persons, Asylum Seekers and Victims of Trafficking in Serbia 
and Montenegro, Report, <http://www.grupa484.org.yu>)
 2. According to the UNHCR report, at the climax of armed 
conflicts among ex-Yugoslav nations in 1993, there have 
been around 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons in 
the region, which made up to one-fifth of the total forced 
migrants in the globe (15 million); Nada Raduski (Belgrade: 
CDI IDN, 2001; Ekonomski Institut, 1996). 
 3. The “eastern model” of nation building is, predominantly, 
related to sentiments of common territory, blood ties, 
genealogies, population movements, vernacular languages, 
tradition and customs, thus implying a group’s homogenity, 
whereas the “western” one is related to legal and political 
community, citizenship, egalitarianism, liberty and democ-
racy, civil culture, thus heterogenity; Saša Nedeljković, Čast, 
krv i suze (Belgrade: Zlatni zmaj /Odeljenje za etnologiju i 
antropologiju Filozofskog fakulteta, 2007).
  4. Vladimir Ilić, Manjine i izbeglice u Vojvodini (Belgrade: 
Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2001).
 5. Mirjana Bobić, “Migracije,” in Studije o Izbeglištvu, ed. Ivan 
Milenković et al . (Belgrade: Grupa “484,” 2006; Mirjana 
Bobić, Demografija i Sociologija: Veza ili Sinteza (Belgrade: 
Službeni Glasnik, 2007). 
 6. David J. Whittaker, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the 
Contemporary World (London and New York: Routledge, 
2006).
 7. Ibid ., 2.
 8. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
Introduction, para. 2, <http://www.internal-displacement.
org/8025708F004D404D/(httpPages)/CC32D8C34EF93C
88802570F800517610> (accessed September 30, 2009).
 9. In order to save space, I will not present the tables; but I will 
refer to data that I have already published in my article; see 
Bobić, “Migracije,” 2006.
 10. Mirjana Bobic, “Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
in Serbia: Statistics, Quality of Everyday Life, Social Capital, 
Coping Strategies, Policies,” in Migrations, Crises and Recent 
Conflicts in the Balkans, ed. Alain Parant (Greece: LADS, 
University of Thessaly Press, 2006), 141–153. 
 11. Ibid .
 12. However, some reports showed that refugees were not 
bound to remain on the social margin. According to an 
expert evaluation, the refugees brought to Serbia 2 to 6 
billion euros of fresh capital (from savings, sale of their 
houses, apartments, properties) that could have been util-
ized in privatization projects; Djuric, Zvezdan, “Propuštena 
šansa,” Politika 5 (October 2004).
 13. It was realized with the assistance of the UNDP office in 
Belgrade; see M. Babović, S. Cvejić, and D. Rakić, Position 
of Refugees in the Labour Market and Their Inclusion in 
Active Labour Market Policies (Belgrade: NGO Group “484,” 
2007). 
 14. Vladimir N. Cvetković, Strah i poniženje: Jugoslovenski rat i 
izbeglice u Srbiji 1991–1997 (Belgrade: Institut za evropske 
studije, 1998). 
 15. Jelena Vlajković et al ., Psihologija izbeglištva (Belgrade: 
Žarko Albulj, 2000).
 16. However, more than half of the interviewees (56.5 per cent) 
had no permanent and stable social relations (low social 
capital) and, thus, remain in the vicious circle of isolation.
 17. Rosalind Edwards, “Overview of the ‘Social Capital’: 
Its Relevance and Implications for Local Communities 
Conference,” Sociologija 46, no. 3 (July-September 2004) 
(Belgrade: Sociolosko drustvo Srbije, 2004); S. Tomanovic, 
“Families and Social Capital in Serbia – Some Issues in 
Research and Policy,” Sociologija 50, no. 1 (January-March 
2008) (Beograd: Sociolosko drustvo Srbije, 2008).
 18. Babović, Cvejić, and Rakić „Position of Refugees in the 
Labour Market and their Inclusion in Active Labor Market 
Policies (Belgrade: NGO Group 484, 2007).
 19. Gordana Vuksanovic, Jugoslovenske izbeglice između želja 
i mogućnosti za povratak (Novi Sad: Katedra za sociologiju 
Filozofskog fakulteta, 2001).
 20. In some districts in England refugees get support which 
amounts even to as much as 200 pounds per elder mem-
ber of a household; in Canada, in the province of Quebec, 
they get 640 Canadian dollars per member, and in other 
provinces about 400 Canadian dollars, which is 15 per cent 
more than the welfare support assigned to the local popula-
tion.
 21. Vojvodina is the more developed part of Serbia, where there 
is a lot of empty space and homelands lacking descendants, 
due to lowered fertility and aging. 
 22. Data are based on the NGO and UNHCR reports, <http://
www.grupa484.org.yu>.
 23. World Refugee Survey – Serbia Submission, draft (Belgrade: 
Group 484, January 2008). 
 24. Kosovo IRL, “Situacija, problemi, rešenja?” (unpublished, 
Belgrade: Grupa 484, 2002).
 Forced Migrants in Serbia 
109
Refuge26-1.indd   109 8/13/10   9:10:19 PM
 25. Ibid . 
 26. According to some foreign humanitarian organizations, no 
less than 90 per cent live under the poverty threshold.
 27. It has been estimated that the implementation of the strat-
egy would cost 620 million dollars, 460 million of which are 
expected from foreign donations.
Mirjana Bobic, Ph .D ., is an associate professor in sociology 
and demography at the University of Belgrade, Serbia . She 
published two books and many peer reviewed articles at home 
and abroad . This article is part of the research “Social Actors 
and Social Change in Serbia 1990–2010” (149005 B), funded 
by Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia, carried out at 
the Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, 
Belgrade . Its main parts were presented at the Conference 
“Refugees and Insecure Nation: Managing Forced Migration 
in Canada,” held at York University, Toronto, June 15–18, 
2008 . The author’s participation at the Conference was co-
funded by Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia and 
the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University .
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
110
Refuge26-1.indd   110 8/13/10   9:10:19 PM
